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I. Introduction
The decision in Clean Sweep Prof'l Parking Lot Maint., Inc., v. Talley1 reveals the
Supreme Court of Virginia's challenging task of applying the Commonwealth's workers'
compensation scheme to industrial accident cases. Fraught with fine-line distinctions, which in
many instances nullify a plaintiff s common law negligence claim, case law in this area deserves
close attention. Verdicts in such statutory employee cases turn on the facts and offer counsel on
both sides the opportunity to creatively argue their client's position.
Part II of this note explores the legal background of Virginia's statutory employee
scheme, first with an overview of two relevant statutes, followed by a thorough review of case
law which interprets the statutes and fleshes out the scheme. Part III provides the facts
surrounding the Clean Sweep case. Part IV analyzes the court's holding in Clean Sweep and
assesses the implications of that decision for future statutory employee litigation.
II. Legal Background
A. Virginia's Statutory Scheme
1. Overview of the Workers' Compensation Act
Virginia's Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act") provides for the compensation of
workers injured in the course of their job performance.2 Liability for the injuries sustained by a
subcontracted worker is addressed in the Act's "statutory employer" provision.3 Three
subsections in the provision address instances in which an entity engages a general contractor or
subcontractor to work on its behalf.4 In each instance, the entity incurs the liability to pay to any
of its subcontracted workers the same compensation the entity would have been liable to pay if
the worker had been a direct employee.
5
The first subsection of the Act's statutory employer provision envisions any person who
hires a general contractor to perform work normally within the scope of that person's own "trade,
business, or occupation." 6 The second subsection applies to relationships farther down the
* Scott Pasierb is currently a second-year law student at the T.C. Williams School of Law at the University of
Richmond in Richmond, Virginia.
1 267 Va. 210 (2004).
2 Va. Code Ann. §§ 65.2-101 et seq. (Michie 2004).
'Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-302.
4 Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-302(A)-(C).
5id.
6 Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-302(A).
Winter/Spring 2005
Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest
contractual chain and targets statutory employer arrangements between general contractors and
their subcontractors. 7 The final subsection addresses a third degree of separation-those
instances in which subcontractors become the statutory employers of other, smaller
subcontractors.
2. Scope of the Act
The Act is limited in scope. An employer is not always liable for workers' compensation
if engaged in property management merely as an agent of the owner. Liability does not attach
where the employer neither engaged in nor profited from services performed by other individuals
engaged in the same trade, business or occupation as the injured worker.9 The Act goes further
to define property management as the "oversight, supervision, and care of real property or
improvements to real property" on behalf of the owner.
10
3. The Exclusivity Provision
If an injured worker is a statutory employee of the party responsible for the injury, the
Act's exclusivity provision limits the worker's remedies to those furnished within the Act.
1
Equally important, however, is that the Act effectively nullifies the worker's common law tort
claim against that statutory employer. 12 Because of its lethality to plaintiffs' tort claims, this
provision serves as the trigger for statutory employer litigation.
The Act also affords injured workers an exception to the exclusivity provision. An
injured worker or a personal representative thereof may pursue a common law suit against any
"other party" for injuries sustained. 3 The term "other party" is defined in case law rather than by
statute.
B. Shell Oil Co. v. Leftwich: Genesis of the Modern Statutory Employer Test
Whether a person is subject to or bound by the exclusivity provision of the Act presents a
mixed question of law and fact requiring a determination in light of the circumstances of each
case.14 In Shell Oil Co. v. Leftwich,'5 the Court applied the test enunciated in Burroughs v.
Walmont/ 6 to assess statutory employer liability.17 In Shell Oil, the injured employee of an
independent service station owner pursued a workers' compensation claim against Shell Oil.18
7 Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-302(B).
8Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-302(C).9 Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-302(D)(1).
10 Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-302(D)(2).
10 Va. Code Ann. §§ 65.2-307.
12 id.
13 Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-309(A).
14 Burch v. Hechinger Co., 264 Va. 165, 169 (2002) (quoting Bosely v. Shepherd, 262 Va.
641, 648 (2001)).
15 212 Va. 715 (1972).
16 210 Va. 98 (1969).
17 Shell Oil, 212 Va. at 722.
s Id. at 716.
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Shell Oil's normal work included the discovery and refining of petroleum, but it performed no
role in the sale of its product to the public-it simply distributed gasoline to service stations. 19
The Court eschewed analysis of whether the contractor's activity was useful, necessary,
or even absolutely indispensable to the statutory employer's business. Rather, it asked if the
activity was, in the oil refinery business, normally undertaken through the statutory employer's
own employees, rather than independent contractors. 20 Noting that Shell Oil was not in the trade,
business, or occupation of selling gasoline directly to the public, the Court concluded that Shell
Oil was not a statutory employer of the independent service station.2 1 It rescinded the injured
employee's workers' compensation benefits, leaving the employee with only a common law
negligence claim against Shell Oil.
22
The Shell Oil analysis, known as the "normal-work test," highlights the Court's modern
statutory employer jurisprudence. 23 A variant of the analysis, known as the "subcontracted-
fraction test," applies in the context of contractor-subcontractor relationships. 24 Where the work
performed by the subcontracted entity in such cases mirrors the trade, business, or occupation of
the contractor, the contractor becomes the statutory employer of the injured worker.25
C. The Delivery Concept: Dividing the Two Groups of Statutory Employee Case Law
Statutory employee case law forms two distinct groups. The first group consists of cases
in which an employer is deemed an "other party" to the project. These cases usually feature a
company whose obligation ends at mere delivery of its own independently manufactured goods
to the jobsite. Because the labor performed by the worker is not part of the defendant's trade,
business, or occupation, the Court allows common law suits to proceed in this group of cases.
The second group consists of cases in which an employer is engaged in the trade, business, or
occupation of another contractor. The Court grants statutory employer status in this latter group
of cases and precludes tort claims per the Act's exclusivity provision.
1. Preservation of Common Law Tort Claims
The Court has issued a string of decisions upholding plaintiffs' tort-based causes of
action against their employers. Although a precursor to the Shell Oil decision, Burroughs
26
illustrates the Court's reliance on the concept of "the final act of delivery" as a distinguishing
characteristic in statutory employee cases. Burroughs, an employee of a trucking subcontractor,
19 See id. at 721-22.
20 Id. (noting "We must therefore determine whether the retailing of gasoline to the general public, admittedly an
indispensable activity to the Shell Oil Company, is an activity normally carried on by Shell through its employees
rather than through independent contractors.").
21 Id. at 724.
22 id.
23 See Cinnamon v. IBM Corp., 238 Va. 471, 476 (1989).
24 id
25 Id.; see also Stone v. Door-Man Mfg. Co., 260 Va. 406, 416-17 (2000) (articulating the "subcontracted-fraction"
test).
26 210 Va. 98 (1969).
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was injured while carrying sheetrock into a house being constructed by the general contractor.27
The trucking company had agreed to deliver and stack sheetrock in rooms of the various houses
under construction.28 The Court held that "the stacking of sheetrock in the several rooms
constituted the final act of delivery, not an act of construction." 29 Consequently, the plaintiff was
not engaged in the general contractor's trade, business or occupation.30 The Court ultimately
viewed the general contractor as an "other party" to the project and subject to common law
suit.31
Hipp v. Sadler Materials32 also prefaces the Shell Oil decision and further distinguishes
the difference between an act of delivery and an act of construction. In Hipp, a concrete
subcontractor's employee was finishing a concrete footing as required under a contract with the
general contractor.33 Defendant Sadler Materials, also a subcontractor, was contracted to furnish
and pour concrete into footings under the general contractor's direction.34 Notably, Sadler
Materials was not required to spread or finish the concrete.35 The Court considered this activity
as mere delivery of an independently-created product and preserved the injured employee's
common law claim against Sadler.36
The Court cited the Hipp decision favorably in Bosley v. Shepherd,37 noting, "[w]e have
held repeatedly that a subcontractor's employee who merely delivers materials to a job site is not
engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of the general contractor."38 In Bosley, the plaintiff,
an employee of a subcontractor, was using a crane under the general contractor's direction to
deposit sheetrock into a partially-constructed building.39 Allowing the plaintiffs common law
tort action to proceed, the Court concluded that use of a crane to deposit the sheetrock at
designated points did not expand the scope of plaintiff employee's duties beyond mere product
delivery.40
Finally, in Yancey v. JTE Constructors, Inc.,41 Virginia's Department of Transportation
hired a general contractor to build a sound barrier. That general contractor then subcontracted
for design, manufacture, and delivery of concrete wall panels to a job site.42 When an employee
of the subcontractor injured himself in the delivery process, the Court ruled that the
subcontractor merely completed a contractual duty and did not actively engage in the general
27 1d. at 99.
281d. at 98.
291d. at 100.
30 id.
31id
32 211 Va. 710 (1971).
33 id.
34 id.
35 id.
36 See id. at 711.
37 262 Va. 641, 648-49 (2001).381 Id. at 648.
39 Id. at 641.
40 See id. at 649.
41 252 Va. 42 (1996).
42 Id. at43.
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contractor's trade, business, or occupation. 43 As a result, the Court reversed and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
44
2. Negation of Common Law Tort Claims
In contrast, the Court has also issued a series of decisions which effectively nullified
some workers common law negligence suits. Each of these cases offers insight on how the Court
diagnoses a statutory employer relationship.
In Bosher v. Jamerson,45 an employee of a subcontracted trucking company delivered
sand to a construction site. At the general contractor's direction, the employee participated in the
spreading of the sand to create a foundation.46 That individual later injured an employee of the
general contractor while spreading the sand.47 The Court barred the plaintiff s common law tort
suit against the trucking company's employee, holding that the individual was performing work
on behalf of his employer, the trucking company, which was part of the trade, business or
occupation of the general contractor.48 The Court concluded that the trucking company,
although an independent contractor, was not an "other party" against whom the plaintiff could
file a common law tort action.49
In Peck v. Safway Steel Products, Inc.,50 an employee of a general contractor died after
falling from scaffolding supplied by the defendant subcontractor. Notably, the subcontractor had
spent over 5,000 man-hours of labor erecting, modifying, and dismantling the scaffolding used
by that general contractor to repair a tall building.51 The subcontractor in Peck also responded to
several change orders, continually repositioned the scaffolding, and uploaded other materials to
the building's roof.52 The Court considered this cumulative activity so integral to the general
contractor's performance that the case exceeded classification as one of mere "delivery."
53
Therefore, the Court considered the subcontractor a statutory employee of the general contractor
and barred the plaintiff s claim as per the Act's exclusivity provision.
54
Decided in the same year, Anderson v. Dillow55 involved a plaintiff employed by Virginia
International Terminals ("VIT"), a general contractor responsible for the daily maintenance
operations at Norfolk International Airport. The defendant, an employee of a waste management
company subcontracted by VIT, crashed his company's vehicle while carrying out his job
4 31d. at 45.
44 id.
45 207 Va. 539 (1966).
46 id.
47 1d. at 540-41.
48 id.
49 1d. at 543.
50 262 Va. 522 (2001).
51 Id. at 527-28.
52 id.
53 Id. at 528.
54 See id.
55 262 Va. 797 (2001).
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responsibilities and injured the plaintiff.56 The Court stated, "[T]hough the broad question here
is whether the defendants were 'other parties,' the precise issue is whether, at the time of the
accident, the defendants were strangers to the trade, business, or occupation in which the plaintiff
was involved. 57 Because the defendant was subcontracted to perform a fraction of the work
formerly assumed by the general contractor in its contract with the airport, the Court rejected the
plaintiff s common law tort claim against the subcontractor.58
III. The Facts of Clean Sweep
In August 1997, Virginia Paving Company ("Virginia Paving") was contracted to repave
several sections of Interstate Highway 95 in Spotsylvania County, Virginia.59 Virginia Paving
procured the contract from the Virginia Department of Transportation.60 The contract required
Virginia Paving to mill the existing road surface, remove the milled asphalt, sweep away loose
debris, and repave the roadway with fresh asphalt.6'
Postured as a general contractor, Virginia Paving hired two subcontractors to assist with
the project.62 J.E. Coleman Trucking Company ("Coleman Trucking") transported asphalt from
Virginia Paving's plant to the jobsite, loaded asphalt into the paving machines, and hauled the
millings from the jobsite back to the plant.63 Clean Sweep Professional Parking Lot
Maintenance, Inc. ("Clean Sweep") cleared the roadway of asphalt milled by Virginia Paving's
machines.
64
Frank Talley, Sr., a Coleman Trucking employee, "loaded fresh asphalt at the Virginia
Paving plant, delivered it to the jobsite, dumped the asphalt into the paving machine, and
reloaded the truck with asphalt millings." 65 While at the site, Talley responded to a request to
examine a disabled Coleman truck also at the site.6 6 A Clean Sweep sweeper vehicle
subsequently struck and injured Talley as he examined the truck.67 Talley sustained significant
back injuries in the collision.68 Talley sued Clean Sweep and the sweeper vehicle's operator,
alleging negligence and recklessness on their behalf.69 The jury rejected the defendants' claims
that the Act was Talley's sole remedy, and issued a verdict in Talley's favor for $900,000.70
56 Id. at 799.
57 Id. at 801.
58 Id. at 802.59 See Clean Sweep, 267 Va. at 212.
60 id.
6 1 
id.
62 id.
63 id.
64 id.
65 id.
66 id.
67 id.
68 id.
69 id.
70 Id. at 212-13.
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On appeal, the Court reviewed the trial court's finding that Coleman Trucking performed
"a function which was solely as supplier or deliverer of goods and, of course, to haul off
goods., 71 Appellant Talley supported this conclusion and argued that his attempts to repair the
disabled Coleman truck were not part of Virginia Paving's trade, business, or occupation. 72 This
relationship, Talley argued, trumped the exclusivity provision of the Act and validated his
common law negligence suit.
73
The Court disagreed and concluded that Coleman Trucking's participation exceeded the
mere delivery of goods to Virginia Paving's project.74 Under its contract with the state highway
department, Virginia Paving was solely responsible for milling, sweeping, and paving the road
surface.75 The Court noted that Coleman Trucking did not "merely deliver [its] own
independently manufactured parts... [but] was hauling asphalt millings to Virginia Paving's
plant and delivering the recycled asphalt from the plant back to the road project to be used in
new paving. '" 76 The Court considered these tasks an essential part of the obligations Virginia
Paving assumed when it undertook the project.77
IV. Analysis
A. Applying the Correct Law
The ostensible purpose of the workers' compensation legislation is to "protect the
employees of subcontractors who are not financially responsible and to prevent employers from
relieving themselves of liability [for compensation] by doing through independent contractors
what they would otherwise do through direct employees." 78 However, the Act's exclusivity
provision also serves to limit an injured employee's capacity to gain compensation by nullifying
certain common law negligence claims in certain cases. The outcome in Clean Sweep illustrates
this fact.
Before rendering its verdict, the Court in Clean Sweep looked comprehensively at the
case law surrounding statutory employee litigation.79 The Court provided several examples of a
subcontractor's mere delivery of finished goods, but distinguished these from cases in which a
subcontractor performed tasks representing an obvious fraction of a general contractor's work.80
After setting the stage for its analysis, the Court properly applied the "subcontracted fraction of
the work" variant of the Shell Oil statutory employee test and correctly classified Coleman
Trucking's participation in Virginia Paving's project.
71 Id. at214.
7 2 1d. at 213-14.
7 3 Id. at 217.
7 4 
Id. at 216-17.
75Id. at 216.
76 id.
77 Id. at 217 (citing Peck, 262 Va. at 528).
78 Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc. v. McReynolds, 216 Va. 897, 902 (1976) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wallace,
172 F.2d 802, 810 (4th Cir. 1949).
79 Clean Sweep, 267 Va. at 214-15.
80 id.
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Counsel for an injured plaintiff employee is well advised to review the Court's opinion in
this and other pro-employer rulings when arguing to preserve a common law cause of action.
Facts weigh heavily in the Court's analysis of each case, and counsel should attempt to
distinguish the facts of all negative case law. The cumulative view of a statutory employee's
activity, taken by the Peck court, for example, may present significant problems to the plaintiff
employee of a subcontractor with a long historical relationship to a construction project.
B. The Future of Statutory Employee Litigation
Application of the "mere delivery of goods" standard is an ingenious tool for evaluating a
subcontractor's level of participation in a project. Undoubtedly, statutory employee litigation
will continue to hinge upon the nature of the tasks performed by a contracted entity before and
after its initial delivery of goods. As the case law illustrates, these facts often make the
difference in close cases. The Court said as much in Clean Sweep, noting that "not all cases that
initially appear to be 'delivery' cases have resulted in a holding that the plaintiff was not engaged
in the trade, business or occupation of the general contractor." 81 This is perhaps the most
valuable outcome of the Clean Sweep decision. The Court's own admission that good lawyering
can make or break a case should give pause to litigants who may envision a decisive victory in
court.
V. Conclusion
The Court undoubtedly arrived at a logical and well-supported decision in Clean Sweep.
The Workers' Compensation Act operated as intended, holding Virginia Paving accountable as a
statutory employer of plaintiff Talley. 82 However, the Clean Sweep decision also effectively
terminated Talley's common law negligence suit against Virginia Paving.83 From a plaintiff s
perspective, some flexibility in the workers' compensation system could enhance its
effectiveness. Family members pursuing a wrongful death action, for example, may welcome
the opportunity to voluntarily forfeit state-mandated workers' compensation in favor of the
pursuit of a common law tort claim. The Act's exclusivity provision offers no such choice,
however, and plaintiff s counsel must be prepared to attack a statutory employee defense and the
supporting case law.
81 Id. at 214.
82 Id. at 216-17.
83 id.
Winter/Spring 2005
